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FINANCIAT SOUNDNESS INDICATORS AND
MACROECONOMIC VARIABIES: AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE DYNAMIC [INKAGES,
ABSTRACT

The Finonciolsoundness lndicotors compiled for Nigerio within the context
of lMFs Finonciol Sector Assessment Progromme hos been proved to be
copoble of pre-empting finonciol crisis. Anolysts, however, considered it

F
Bobo N. Yoobo'

INTRODUCTION
The Asion finonciol crisis of the lote
1990s demonstroted the need for

odditionol doto requirement not
only for timely ond efficient
intervention of the regulotory
outhorities but olso for effective
ond prooctive oversight of

member countries by the

lnternotionol Monetory Fund (lMF).
The crisis, like most others before
ond ofter, wos o foll-out of o set of
interreloted problems ronging
from finonciol sector weokness,
eosy globol liquidity conditions os
well os crisis in the externol sector
orising from contogion running
from Thoilond to other economies.
This wos loter corroboroted by the
globol finonciol crisis (GFC) thot
erupled in 2007 orising from the
subprime crisis in the mortgoge
sectorof the United Stotes.

ln on ottempt of

solving the
problem, IMF lounched some
initiotives on doto collection so os

to expond the coveroge of
finonciol system, in order to hove
quick insight into potentiol
finonciol ond externol

vulnerobillties thot ore copoble of

imperotive to further explore the chorocteristics of the indicotors,
porticulority its relotionships with other mocroeconomic voriobles to
enhonce the understonding of its dynomics so os to improve on its
usefulness. This study, os o moiden ottempt, opplies outoregressive
distributed log opprooch to investigote the dynomic linkoges between
the indicotors ond selected mocroeconomic voriobles covering the
period 2007Q1 to 2015Q4. The results indicote thot mocroeconomic
events dictote the stote of heolth of the Nigerio finonciol system. While
chonges in the level of economic octivities inversely offects copitol
odequocy, it is directly reloted to osset quolity ond bonks profitobility.
Asset quolity deteriorotes while inflotion rises. Bonks returns diminishes ond
osset quolity wones os exchonge rote depreciotes. The study, therefore,
suggests immediote deployment of FSls os o monitoring instrument in
conjunction with the existing micro-prudentiol tools while effort should
continue to improve the compilotion process to enhonce theiroccurocy.
Key Words: FSls, finonciol crisis, mocroprudentiol regulotion, ARDL, Nigerio
JEL
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instigotlng systemic crisis. These
stotisticol initiotives includes; the
introduction of templotes on
internotionol reserves ond foreign
currency liquidity, externol debt
stotistics ond finonciol soundness
indicotors (FSls). The FSls meosure
lhe current finonciol heolth ond

soundness

of the finonciol

o country os well os
their corporote ond household
counterporties (lMF, 2006l'.

institutions in

Although, IMF hos been collecting
monetory stotistics from member
countries before the introduction
of FSls, the doto is less
encompossing ond does not
provide enough informotion on
the soundness, risk or vulnerobilities
in the finonciolsystem (Armido, et
ol., 2006: Yoobo ond Adomu,
20 r 5).

The IMF storted the process by
inviting o group of experts,
representotives of member

countries, regionol ond
internotionol orgonizotions os well
os stondord setters to o meeting in
2002 where on ogreement wos
reoched not only on the need for
odditionol doto but olso on the
criticol indicotors thot is required
for efficient monitoring of the
finonciol system. This wos followed
,l00
by o survey of over
countries,
on the use, compilotion ond
disseminotion of these indicotors
ofter which two sets of FSls were
ogreed upon; nomely: core ond
encouroged FSls. While IMF
member countries were obliged to
compile the 'core FSls', they ore

only urged to compile the
'encouroged set'' depending on

notlonol circumstonces. The IMF in

2006 published o guide on FSI
compilotion procedure. However,
following onother consultotion,
the Guideline wos modified in
2013. The FSls list wos exponded to

cover money morket

' The views expressed herein do not represent or necessorily reflect thot of Centrol Bonk of Nigerio where I work
rs o stoff of Stotistics Deportment, Centrol Bonk of Nigerio.

'Mr. Yoobq

'Now referred to os "odditionol set"
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insuronce corporotions, pension
funds, other nonbonk finonciol
in stitu tio n s, n o n f in o n c io

I

corporotions ond households. Five
of the FSls were dropped due to its
non-comporobility stotus, while
nineteen others were odded to
the list. The nomencloture for
'Encouroged FSls' wos olso

chonged to Additionol

FSls'.

Nigerio storted the compilotion of
the FSls in 2010 with the indicotors
doting bock to the first quorter of
2007.

Although, vorious studies were

conducted

on the

mocroeconomic determinonts of

bonking system soundness in
Nigerio but to the best of my
knowledge, none of the studies
utilized the FSls doto compiled in
line with the lMFs Finonciol Sector
Assessment Progromme (FSAP)
initioted in the 1990s. Hence. this
study is o moiden ottempt to

determine the long-run
relotionships between
mocroeconomic ond FSls

compiled for Nigerio within ihe
FSAP fromework. To ochieve this,
the study is divided into five
different sections. After this
introduction, is section two which
considers post literoture on ihe
topic, while section three detoils
the methodology. Section Four
onolyses the results ond the lost
section concludes the poper os

ond new environment hypothesis
linking monetory policy to
finonciol ond economic stobility.
Thereofter, it presents o stylized
foct on the trend of some selected
FSls

o

for Nigerio ond concludes with

summory review

of

reloted

empiricol literoture.

2.1.1

Environment Hypothesis".

TheConventionolView

The conventionol view

2.1.2 The New Environmenl

linking

monetory, finonciol ond
economic stobility onolysed

herern derives from the work of
Bordo et ol., (2000). They ore of
the view thot monetory policy
fromework thot focuses ond
ochieves stoble prices is likely to, ot
leost in the long-run, promote not
only non-inflotionory growth but
olso stoble finonciol system. There
seems to be o consensus omongst

economists, thot curtoiling
inflotionory spirol which is the

primory objective of monetory
policy hos no remorkoble trode-

off with the ottoinment of finonciol

ond economlc stobility". The

proponents of the conventionol
hypothesis ore of the view thot
inflotionory spirol, for instonce,
creotes economic instobility ond
consequently finonciol frogility.
This is becouse, it is either lorgely
occomponied by or resulted in
informotion osymmetry, weok
bolonce sheet of bonks orising
from folling ossets prices, income

wellos offers on insight into further
requirements thot is copoble of
enhoncing the usefulness of the
FSls doto to Nigerion pollcy

redistribution ond weok

mokers.

Schwortz (1995) hypothesizes thot
monetory ond price stobility could

2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theorelicol Foundolion of
Monelory, Finonciol ond
Economic Stobility

This section reviews relevont
theoreticol ond empiricol studies
on the relotionship omongst
finonciol stobility /frogility,
monetory policy stonce ond the
performonce of the economy. ln
so doing il storts by providing

insighi into both the conventionol

stobility. Opponents of Schwortz
hypothesis cited the US finonciol
crises of the 1920s, I 990s ond 2000s
os well os Jopon in the l9B0s. They
opined thot these ore coses of
finonciol instobilitles thot occurred
in periods of stoble of prices,
hence the birth of " New

investment horizon, omongst
others.

leod to finonciol stobility.

He

emphosized thot price stobillty is
not only necessory but sufficient
for finonciol stobility. Although,
Schwortz hypothesis is lorgely
contested by economists, but
some empiricol studies, os will be
review loter, provides little support.

For instonce, while empiricol
evidences support the notion of
price stobility os o precursor of

finonciol stobitity, it negotes the
notion of stoble prices os o
sufficient condition for finonciol

'See Schwortz (l 995)

l0

Hypolhesis

Controry to the conventionolview

of o stoble economlc

ond

finonciol system in period of stoble
prices, the new environment
hypothesis (NEH) visuolized o new

set of emerging trends thot

constitute whot they togged NEH.
According to the hypothesis, the

new environment is chorocterized
primorily by; low ond stoble prices

orising from the prooctive policy
effort of centrol bonks; finonciol
morkets liberolisotion os well os
business cycle moderotlon. The

proponents of the'new

environment hypothesls' opined
thot the obove listed three
developments ore consequences

of the interoction between
voriotions in monetory ond
finonciol policy regimes over time
os speorheoded by most centrol
bonks ocross the globe. Hence,
they convoss for the recognition
of monetory ond finonciolstobility
enhoncing policies from the
perspectives of the NEH (Crocket,
2003).

Bosed on the Joponese
experience of finonciol

imbolonces in the l9B0s os well os
the South Koreon experience of
the 1990s, the NEH concludes thot
price stobility moy not necessorily
be sufflcient for finonciol stobility.
This is becouse price stobility could
be on end result of on onti-bios

sfonce of the monetory

outhorities, hence inf lotionory
spirol moy be contoined due to

positive shocks in supply,
expectotion of folling prices in
future or excessive competition
thot retords the pricing power of
firms. lt could olso orise from
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competitive flnoncing posture of
the finonciol system orising from

finonciol sector deepening,
development ond liberolisotion

2.2. Slylized focl on lhe Trend of
some Selecled FSls for Nigerio

From Figure '1, the rotio of
reguloted copitol to risk weighted
ossets (RWA) commonly referto os
copitol odequocy rotlo is within
the occeptoble internotionol
stondord of minimum 8.0 per cent
for most periods except between
2009Q4 to 2011Q3. This period
coincides with the globol finonciol
crisis (GFC) thot storted from the
mortgoge sector of the United
Stotes (Sere-Ejembi et ol., 2012,
Yoobo ond Adomu,2015). Within
this period, copitol odequocy
rotio wos of its lowest of 0.2 per
cent in the third quorterof 2010.

The implicotion of the industry
wide copitol odequocy folling for
below the internotionol mlnimum
stondord within the period, is the
inobility of the Nigerion bonks to
obsorb shocks on their oggregote
bolonce sheet. The situotion must
hove been worst for some bonks if
considered individuolly, hence the
need for intervention. Viewed
dif

f

erently, since

odequocy rotio

is

co pito

I

o leveroge rotio

ond leveroge mognif ies the
voriobility of income, the shorp foll
between 2009Q4 to 201 I Q3
should hove ordinorily send o
strong signolto bonks on the need
to moderote their ottitude towords
risk.

Non-performing loons to totolloon
represented os qo (osset quolity)
in Fig. I skyrocketed from 10.2 per
cent in 2007Q1 to 24.4 per cent in
2009Q3 ond climoxed ot 38.3 per
cent in 2010Q2, thereofter; it
declined continuously to 3.7 per
cent in 2012Q4. This decline wos
lorgely ottributed to the octivities

of Asset monogement

Corporotion of Nigerio (AMCON)
thot bought most of the toxic
ossets of the DMBs within the
period. lt increosed to 4.0 per cent
in 2013Q,l ond with prooctive
effort of the CBN, it fell groduolly
until it reoched the bottom of 1.5
per cent in the third quorter of
201 5.

Profltobility of the induslry os proxy
by return on ossets (ROA) for most
of the reviewed period wos foirly

impressive until when it
coincidentolly turned negotive in
the third quorter of 2009 os the

osset quolity drosticolly

deterioroted. lt wos of its worst of B.B per cent in 2009Q4. However,
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except for the third quorter of 201
when it fell to - 1 .4 per cent.

2.3

I

Review of Reloted

Empiricol Studies

.a0

:0

with vorious interventions by the
CBN, os highlighted eorlier, ROA
turns positive ond remoin so

I

150

r

The relotionships between the
strength of the finonciol sector
ond the level of economic
octivities, os well os the generol
price level is well documented in
literoture. For instonce,

o

strong

link hos long been estoblished
between boom ond depression of
business cycles ond finonciol
sector vulnerobility ond stobility,
respectively. lt is ocknowledged
thot credit grows sporodicolly
during boom ond foll drosticolly in
periods of depression (Fowod ond
Boshir, 201 3). The logic behind this
is thot credit growth during booms
ore consequence of stoble cosh
flow streoms for both bonks ond
debtors which in-turn focilitotes
timely repoyment, hence good
credit scores ond increosing credit
worthiness ond consequently the
rising oppetite of bonks to lend
more. On the other hond, with
depression, cosh flow streoms for
both bonks ond debtors become

unstoble, poyment of due

obligotions becomes

diff icult
leoding to excessive coution from
bonks

not only to escope defoult but
olso to ovoid illiquidity, hence
credit squeeze which in-turn fuels
continuous depression ond the
cycle continues. View from the
demond side, with economic
boom, investors demond for more
credit orising from optimism in
future returns ond the reverse olso
holds for recession.

Prior

to the work of Fowod ond

t00

Boshir 2013, Bordo ond

{l

J!

Woheelock (l 998) in their study on
US, UK ond Conodo conclude

JO

00

0

o{C4$r$riffi3$fyco'$.{.+;.s"..i\'$"so.'$er{ffi
+-.cA :c'r.TA

c+

thot price level instobility

contributes significontly to
finonciol instobility. ln the some

-tDA
'The stondord wos set by the Bosel Committee on Bonking Supervision (BCBS).
'This is the period when CBN injected obout N520 billion into five bonks in the form of Tier 2 copitol

il
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vein, Bordo et ol., (2000) found o
strong link for the U S, from price
level shocks to finonciol instobility
.l790
porticulorly from
io 1933 ond
'1980
to 1997. lssing (2003) reoch o
conclusion for the US, thot bonking
crisis occurred during recessionory
periods thot usuolly coincides with
inflollonory spirols. Bourke (1989),
Molyneux ond Thornton (1992),
Dimirguc-Kunt ond Huizingo (1998)
reported positive relotionship
between interest rote ond bonks
profitobility for the some US.

With economic boom in ploce,
non-performlng loons (NPLs) ore
expected to decline orising from
high revenue profile of borrowers
to meet credit obligotions. The
quest for higher income, however
lures bonks into more lending
including to less credit worthy
borrowers, hence repoyment
becomes extremely dif f icult
during downturn, thus growth in
NPLs. This link hos long been
confirmed by empiricol studies. For

instonce, Morcucci ond

Quonglioriello (2008) employed

vector outoregression

(VAR)

technique to exomine the impoct
of business cycle on loon quolity in
Itoly from 1990 to 2004 ond found
thot NPLs increose/decline during
boom/recession. Similorly, Keeton
ond Moris (1987) ossess the
behoviourof NPLs of some bonks in
US between 1979 ond l9B5
ond found thot economic boom

the

increoses bonks oppetite

(porticulorly the lorger bonks) for

lending to less credit worthy
customers, hence on upturn in

during recession. In the some
vein, Sinkey ond Greewolt (1991)
opply o simple lineor regression on
the US bonking doto from 1984 to
1987. The result shows thot both
internol ond externol f octors
offects loon losses in the US.
lnternol foctors, occording to
them includes voloiile funds,
excessive lending ond interest
rote.
NPLs

Using Sponish doto, Solos ond
Sourino (2002) employed o

dynomic model on o ponel doto
to investigote the determinonts of

NPLs. The study found thot reol
GDP growth rote, the size of bonks,

determine the impoct of

morket power, credit exponsion
ond copitol odequocy rotio ore
instrumentol to voriotions in NPLs.
This is portiolly substontioted by
Jlmenez ond Sourino (2006) who
submltted thot GDP growth rote,
soft terms of credit ond high
interest rote in reol terms ore the
mojor determinonts of NPLs ln

non-performing loons in Nomibio
from the first quorter of 2000 to the
second quorter of 2014. The results
reveol thot the voriobles co-move
in the long-run. The results olso
show o uni-directionol cousolity
from oll the exomined mocrovoriobles to osset quolity.

mocroeconomic voriobles on

Spoin.

3.

ln his study on sub-Sohoro Africon
countries Fofock (2005) odopted o

with substontiol odjustments to not

pseudo-ponel model ond found
reol exchonge rote, level of
economic octivities, net interest
morgin, reol interest rote ond
interbonk loons to be the key
determinonts of NPLs. Bobihugo
(2007) utilised doto from Asio,
Europe ond Sub-Sohoro Africo to
determine the links between
finonciol soundness indicoiors ond
mocroeconomic voriobles using o
generolised method of moment
(GMM). The results reveol thot

copitol odequocy rotio,
profitobility ond osset quolity
indicotors ore strongly reloted to
differeni phoses of business cycles,

inflotion ond reol GDP. While
business cycles ond inflotion rote
ore positively reloted to FSls, reol

GDP is Inversely reloted to NPLs
ond copitol odequocy rotio. ln the
some vein, Volentino et ol., (2009)

studied 389 bonks in 41 SSA
countries using GMM. They
reported positive relotionship
between inflotion ond bonks
profitobility. They olso estoblished
positive relotionship between
the level of economic octivities,
the slze of bonks ond profitobility.

EMPIRICALMETHODOLOGY

ln line with Bobihugo (2007) but

only the

def

initions of the

porometers, but olso to the
constituents of the determinonts
of eoch of the selected FSls os
objective function os well os
implementotion methodology,
the dynomic linkoges omongst
finonciol soundness indicotors
ond mocro-fundomentols is
explored from three perspectives.

The empiricol explorotion
considers the copitol, ossets
bosed ond profitobility bosed

indicotors in thot order. This is due
to their importonce in determining
bonks stobility orfrogility. The study
covers the period 2007Q1 to
2015Q4. The choice of the study

period is informed by doto

ovoilobility. The Centrol Bonk of
Nigerio storted compiling doto on
finonciol soundness indicotors in
the context of the lMFs Finonciol
Sector Assessment Progromme
{FSAP) in 20,l0 with the indicotors
doting bock to the first quorter of
2007.The equotions toke the form:

o

CopitolAdequocy

Jomes et ol., (2014) opply rondom

) t-1 t {y1 I
Be, I ar, + 4st + Vtl, i oasi, I 0,

effect model to investigote the
influence of bonk specific, industry

specific ond mocroeconomic
voriobles on prof itobility of
Nigerion bonks using doto from
l99B to 2012. Ihey reported o

positive effect of copitol

odequocy, bonk

size, growth

ond
deposit on profitobility while
inflotion ond interest rote yielded
negotive coefficients. Johonnes
(2015) used o VAR technique to
12

"'

rwat

= o+y

'TCt

ttif6+

.TWA2

(1)

Where rc stonds for regulotory
copitol, rwo is risk weighted ossets

(implying copitol odequocy
rotio), y is growth rote of gross
domestic product, if denotes

inf lotion rote, e represents
exchonge rote of fhe Noiro, r is
interest roie, s connotes growth
rote of the size of the finonciol
system proxy by percentoge
chonges in totol ossets, tl is totol
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loon reflecling the risk oppetlte of
the system, osi is oll sholl shore
index, 4 ond ore chonge ond

constont , respectively. The
coefficients of the respective
estimoted porometers ore
represented by Y, €, n,0, o, n, qr
ond co; ond 0 is the error term. The
subscript t is the time dimension.
is

the errorterm.

Assets Quolily

T= t+ ty,+ ttif,+ Be,
*

ar1

I

PPoPt

* att, + a2! + 0,

(2)

Where npl stonds for

nonperforming loons, pop is the
growth rote of the populotion, ff

connotes totol trode, co

represents totol copitol, to is totol
ossets, 0 is o constont term ond (,
fl, p, r,>, p, Q ond @ ore coefficienis
of their respective voriobles. ore os

defined under equotion

(1)

Profito bility I ndic otor

?rt=

$

nnl.

"+(b
*6nie,*v
' ' rwat+€ tl,
'
t 0,

Ldr,

co,

by

estimotes of the long-run
coefficients irrespective of
whether the underlying regressors
ore stotionory ot l(0) or l(l) or o
mixture of both. ln other words, it
ignores the order of integrotion of
the voriobles (Pesoron et o1.2001).
Secondly, it provides unbiosed
estimotes of the long-run model os
well os volid t-stotistics even when
some of the regressors ore
endogenous (Horris & Sollis, 2003).
Thirdly, lt yields high quolity results
even

if

the somple size is smoll.

Following equotions (l) ond (2), lf
forthe purpose of convenience
rct
rwA,t

ond

is

denoted

q5

is represenled os

6q qn6 149

tlt

the

qa,

versions of equotions (l )
become:
p
\-t

$+ >
/J'

Y1lcat-,+

* ylcar-, +

ARDL

to

two common operoting

rotios

used os proxy for profitobility return on ossets ond return on
equity. The choice of ROA in this
study is preclicoted on the foct
thot if bonks leveroge is mostly
determined by regulotion, os it
were in Nigerio, using ROE os
opined by Sundororojon et ol.,
(2002) will disregord the risk
ossocioted with high leveroge,
thus ploces ROA os the best ond
most prefer mecsure of bonks
profitobility.

Equotion (l) to (3) ore
implemented
using

Atqu,

*

(4)

- o +leuca,-, * ){,ax,-,

elqar-,

Lpr, =

,3

+

q,JXt-' +

*frnn

,-,

0t

*

f

(5)

,,0,,,-,

(6)
* tprr-, + l,lXt1 + et
Where A is o first difference term, lis
noturol logorithm, I is noturol
logorithm, X is o vector of the

deterministic voriobles os
represented in equotions l, 2 ond
3, ond p represents the optimol log
of the model. All other nototions
ore os exploined under equotions
(1 ) to (3).
ln line with Gronger representotlon

theorem, the error correction

versions of equotions 4, 5 ond 6 ore

formuloted respectively os:

outoregresslve distributed log

opprooch to cointegrotion
by Pesoron et ol.,

developed

r3

(7)

+ <ECMFI + et
p

Llqar:,

p

*I

eL,lqar-,+

t=1

+ <EClvlt-1

+

(8)

0t

p

Apr,

=

6

l{,4X,-,
t=0
p

+lr/urr,-,+

f

r,atx,-,
(e)

+ <ECMt_r + et

Where ECMs ore error correction
versions of the respective long-run
equotions. All other voriobles ore
os defined under equotions (4) to
(6).

4,

EMPIRICAL

RESULTS

4.1 Time Series Properlies of
lhe Doto
of the
voriobles used for the estimotion
reported in Toble I shows thot the
distribution is osymmetricol. The
lowest ond highest kurtosis of 1.76
for ly ond ldr, ond 13.80 for lnie
reveols o substontiol Skewness in
the doto (Toble 1).
The summory slotistics

f,,o,r,-,

{tLXr-r + 0t

I Zt,o,r,-,

(3)

tar

defined under equotions (1) ond
(2). lt is well known thot there ore

p

Alca,=r*IyAlca,-,

consistent

'

(3)

p

numerous considerotions. One,

the model generoles

r=1

Where pr stonds for profit proxy by
return on ossets (ROA), dris deposit
rote, nie represents net interest
income. All other voriobles ore os

(ARDL)

of the ARDL

opprooch is informed

Llca,=
'

+ (yr* nifr* per* arr*
TC,
'

(2001). The cholce

Toble 2 presents the correlotion
coefficient of the voriobles used
for the estimotion. Coreful scrutiny
of the Toble reveols strong

correlotion omong

some

voriobles. For instonce, lco ond
lcoto is 0.96, 0.95 for ls ond ltl, 0.91
for le ond lr ond 0.91 between lr
ond ls. Other voriobles thot ore
strongly correloted includes lr ond
Itl, ly ond lr, le ond ls, ly ond ltt
omong others. These strong
correlotions omong the voriobles
presupposes the existence of

seriol correlotion, hence
necessitotes post estimotion

diognostic test.

The study odopted Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) bosed on
Akoike lnf ormotion Criterion (AlC),
ond Phillip Perron (PP) to exomine
the stotlsticol properties of the
doto. Toble 3 shows thot the doto
is o mixture of l(0) ond l(l) ond
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Statistics of the Variables used for the Estimations

k

lr

ls

lasi kl

ltt

Mean

2.50

15.92

10.22

502

3.12

30.44

10.37

29.62

15.39

2.t9

Median

2.89

16.06

10.24

504

3.14

30.42

10.36

29.66

15.46

2.42

Maximum

3.19

16.26

15.06

5.28

330

30.92

1

1.05

30.1 7

15.16

2.99

Minimum

t.67

15.37

4.12

4.17

2.87

29.60

9.90

28.56

11.66

0.23

1.99
1,96
3.65
0.38

Std. Dev.

1.01

0,30

2.80

0.

l4

0.13

0.35

0.33

0.38

0.31

0.75

0.82

Skewness

L.+ I

0,59

0.05

0.04

0.58

0.64

0.35

0,95

0.87

1.67

0,63

Kurtosis

9.2s

t.76

2.21

298

238

2.98

208

3.93

2.65

5. 18

213

95,35

4.36

0.94

0.01

2.59

2.45

2.01

6.7?.

4.17

23.93

lca

Jarque-Bera

at1

Probability
0bservations

36

0.1 r

0.62

0.99

0.27

36

36

36

36

037

0.29
36

36

-

-

2.52

0.09

000

0.28

36

36

36

003
36

lnie ldr

lcata

rua

26.29

0.90

26

26.33

1.00

24

27.04

1.46

7A

24.25

0.29

88

0.44

0.36

28

2:7 -0,37

1.6

13 80

LT6

9,!

214,58

3.1+

lLT

0.21
36

36

JO

Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables used for the Estimations

if

lca
lca

ly

le

lr

lasi ltl

ls

ltt lcata I

lnie ldr

roa

1.00
-0.1

1

1.00

if

-0.44

-0.02

1.00

le

-0.05

0.77

0.01

r.00

lr

0.01

0.81

0.09

0.91

ls

0.10

0.86

0.09

0.85

0.91

1.00

lasi

0.42

-0.26

-0.65

-0.47

-0.42

-0.29

1,00

Ifl

-0.12

0.79

0.2s

0.82

0.89

0.95

-0.34

Itt

-0.18

0.84

0. 13

0.55

0.58

0.70

-0.36

0.61

1.00

-0 08

0.00

0.46

-0.18

-0 33

-0 55

-0.31

-0.31

-0.28 -0.64

1.00

r2

-0.15

0.13

015 -0.09

-0.01

1.00

-0.04

0.59

0.00

-0.52

0.49

-0.25

-0.07

1.00

0.22

0.64

-0.51

-0.45

0.34

-0.24

-0.27

0.22

1.00

1.00

lcata

0.96

-0.26

-0.38

-0.16

lqa

-0.73

-0.48

0.45

-0.38

-0.42

lnie

-0.06

0.08

0.06

0.01

0.1 r

ldr

0.43

-0.27

-0.42

-0.02

004

0.28

-0.34

-0.42

-0.44

-0.50

r0a

0.

-0.42

1.00

1.00

Table 3: Unit-Root Test of the Data used for the Estimation
Augmented Dickey-Fuller

Phillip Perron

AIC
r(0)
_2.762***

I(l)

r(0)

lca

-2.368

-2 t20

-5.420*

ly

-0.660

-4.451*

-1.838
-2.334
-0.200
-2.481
-3.049

-9.159*
-5.616*
-3.979*
-5.249*
-4.901*

if

-2.284

-5.562*

le

-0.899

lr

-4.118**
-5.331*

-4.102*
-4.435*

/s

lasi

Itl

_3.557**{,

38**

-5.767*

1.788

-5.204*

-3.77 1**

-2.9s8

-3.1

-

ht

0.597

-3.547**
-5.959*

1.225

-3.504*
-6.061 *

lcata
lqa

-3.419**

-2.597

-2.002

-4.669*

-1.296

-5.641*

lnie

-6.641*

-6.701*

ldr

-0.688

-5.529*
-7.902*
-4.903 *

-25.948*
-4.790*
-8.276*

-

1.136

roa

-0.716*

-2.345**
-6.712*
-2.125**
Notes: *, ** ond *** significant at lo/o, 59/o and 10?o, respecti't'el1

I
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does not contoin l(2) series, hence

lend support for the use of bound
test (Toble 3).

Table 4: Statistics for Selecting Lag Order of the Model

Capital Adequacy Model

p

I

0

2

3

AIC

1.9639

2.2410

2.2391*

t9t28

SBC

2.2T18

2.5521

2.8676

2.8651*

HQ

2.0714

2.3484

2.4534

2.2332*

(HOC) for copitol odequocy
model, Akoike lnformotion

Criterion (AlC) ond Honnon Quinn
Criterion (HOC) for osset quolity
equotion ond Akolke lnformotion
Criterion (AlC), Schwoa Boyesion
Criterion (SBC) ond Honnon Quinn
Criterion (HaC) for profitobility
indicotor model. The bosis for
selection is the consensus of the
informotion criterio (Toble 4).

Asset Quality Model

AIC

0.7496

1

185

0.8399*

0.2726

SBC

r.0575

t.4295

t.4684

t.2250*

HQ

0.8570

1.22s9

t.0542*

0.5931

.1

Profitability Indicator Model

AIC

8.9877

8.8779*

8.8610

8.7615

SBC

9.3836

9.2778*

9.669t

9.98s9

The moximum log length for the
model wos determined through
Schworz Boyesion Criterion (SBC)
ond Honnon Quinn Criterion

HQ
9.12s9
9.0160*
9.t366
9.1134
*
Note:p is the lag order of the model. is the optimal lag length. AIC

4.2

denotes Akaike Information Criterion, SBC ls Schw,arz Ba,vesian

4.2.1

Criterion, HQ is Hannan Quinn Criterion

Resulls

of the

Estimoled

Equolions
Long Run Results

Toble 5 reports the long-run results

of the estimoted equotions.

- Run Results

Table 5:

Equation 4
Dependent

Equation 5

LLSA

ALCA

Variables

Coefficienl
_41.364***

c

uation 6

t-Stotistics

Coeflicient

_1.866 0.576'r*,x

1.92

lca

Coe.fficient
1.350*

3.92

-5.660x *

-2.31

0.95

0.37

3.09

0.27

6.921*

6.t6

0.65

-0.035 *:* *

1.978

-0.21

-0.24

.764"*

-2.90

-8.832* *

-2.94

0.5-s

0.13

0.t2

0.61

6.200*

3.49

0.51

0.43

1.'75

1.45

-1.126*

-3.556

lr

0.70

if

0.04

Ie

2.47

ls

6.169*

3.3

Itl

-6.390*

-3.5 6

lasi

1.07

1.64

2.084 *

1.24

-1

0.503

**

lnie
lqa
Icata

-0.5?7+

-1.91

p0p

0.12

0.61

Itt

8.051* x

2.s3

0.78

0.93

0.94

0.59

0.79

0.81

AIC

t.465

-0.451

3.218

SBC

2.191

0.546

4.321

HQC

t.109

-0. I 16

3.629

2.496

2.529

f

DW Statistics
Note: AIC

is .4kaike

3.34

1

dlr

Adjusted

t-Slatistics

*

ly

R2

odequocy. osset quolity ond

ALPR

t-Stalistics

2.504
Inforntonn Criterion,

SBC

r

Schy'arz Bq'esian Criterion, HQC

Quinn Crrtenon and DW'rs Durbin Watson

rc

The

long-run results yield odjusted R2,s
of 0.59, 0.79 ond 0.Bl for copitol

profitobility indicotor equotions,
respectively. These shows thot the
overoll models ore well fitted. The
Durbin Wotson stotistics of 2.504 f or

copitol odequocy equotion,

2.496 for osset quolity equotion
ond 2.529 for profitobility indicotor
equotion pre-supposes lock of
evidence of seriol correlotion
which wos onticipoted orising
from the results of the conelotion
motrix.

The Wold test of oll the three
estimoted equotions os reported
in Toble 6 reveols thot the
colculoted F-stotistics ore oll
higher thon their respective upper

bounds criticol volues

os

tobuloted In Pesoron et ol., (2001).
For instonce, the F-stotistics of
5.898 ond 10.826 reported for

copitol odequocy ond
Honnan-

osset
quolity equotions ore higher thon
the upper criticol volue of 3.79 for k
equol to 7 ot 1.0 per cent. ln the

some vein, the profltobility
indicotor equotion yields on F-

stotistics of 7.465 obove the upper

\
t5
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Table 6: Wald Test for the Estimated

uations

df Prob. Value Critical Values
Equation 5.898 (8, 17) 0.001 2.45 - 3.79
F-statistic

Capital Adequacy

10.826 (7, 11)

Asset Quality Equation

Profita
Note:

The

uation

Indicator

1.465

ll,

criticalyalues are obatinedfrom Pesaran

criticol bound of 3.60 for k equols
l0 of 1.0 per cent. These confirm

the existence of long-run
relotionships omong the
exomined voriobles in ollthe three
equotions.
Considering the long-run result of
the copitol odequocy equotion os
reported in Toble 5, while income
ond totol loon portfolio of the
bonking system ore significontly

negolively reloted

to

copitol

odequocy, the size of the industry
is positively reloted to copitol
odequocy. lnterest rote, inflotion,
exchonge rote ond ollshore index
return positive coefficients but
stotisticolly insignificont.

The negotive relotionship
between income ond copitol

odequocy ond totol loon ond
copitol odequocy is in line with the
work of Fowod ond Boshir, (2013).
This meons thot improvement in
the level of economic octivities
sprouts odditionol request for loon
focilities, hence increose in totol
loon ond conseguently decline in
copitol odequocy orising from
excessive lending by the industry.
Conversely, economic downturn

brings obout higher copitol
odequocy rotio. This is possible

due to the reluctonce of bonks to
creote more ossets orising from
increose in defoult probobility.
Vorious studies (Wong, Choi ond
Fong. 2OO5; Bobihugo, 2007:
Yoobo, Dolhotu ond Adomu,
2014) hove proved thot bonks
oppetite for risk decline during
recession ond rise during boom.
Higher loon olso exerts negotive
influence on copitol odequocy
rotio. Excessive creotion of ossets

I
et.

0.000

2.45 - 3.79

0.002

2.26 - 3.60

Al., (2001)

is likely to eot up port of the
required regulotory copitol. This
further corroborotes the inverse
relotionship between the level of
economic octivities ond copitol

odequocy. As the level of
economic ociivities peok, quest
for buslness finoncing rises, while
probobility of defoult declines,
hence increose in credit creotion
by bonks orising from confidence

in the system ond consequently
foll in

copitolodequocy rotio.

However, controry to the findings
of Bobihugo (2007)'os the size of
the bonking system grows so do
copitol odequocy noturolly

follows suit since copitol

odequocy is o rotio of the bonks'
copitol to the risk weighted ossets.
This exploins the positive ond
significont relotionship between
copitol to ossets rotio ond copitol
odequocyrotio.
ln cose of osset quolity equotion,
the long-run result reveols thot the
level of economic octivities, os

ogoinst copitol odequocy

equotion, is positively reloted to
the quolity of osset of 5.0 per cent.
Similody, interest rote ond totol
trode ore directly reloted to osset
quolity of 5.0 per cent eoch.
Conversely, quolity of ossets

deteriorotes os Inflotion rises,
exchonge rote oppreciotes ond
the rotio of copitol to ossets
increoses. Populotion growth
returns o positive relotionship but
not significont.

The relotionship belween osset
quolity ond the levelof economic
octivities ond totol trode is in line
with theory, most of the empiricol
16

literoture eorlier reviewed ond
conventionolwisdom. Nigerio is o
consumption economy thot fores

mostly on trode porticulorly
externol trode, increose in the
volume of trode signifies rise in the
levelof economic octivities which
in-turn brings obout increose
lending os result of increosing
quest for finoncing os well os
credit worthiness of borrowers.
Wlth robust economic octivities,
the rote of defoult declines even
in the foce of increosing interest
rote.

Return on ossets estobllshes o
positive ond significont
relotionship with interest rote ond

net interest income,

while

exchonge rote ond copitol

odequocy rotio negotively offect
bonks profitobility. This implies thot

the Nlgerion bonking system

significontly benefits from high
interest rote ond the poss through
to lending rote outweigh the poss
through to deposit rote.

This is

true

considering the foct Nigerion
bonks do not offer reosonoble

rote on deposit. ln foct, some
bonks do not remunerote even
soving deposits. The positive
coefficient of net interest income
points to the foct thot interest
income is the mojor sources of
income to Nigerion bonks ond
profitobility of the system improves
os it grows.

The negotive relotionship
between copitol odequocy ond
bonks profitobility indicotes thot
os bonks strive to meet the copitol
odequocy requirement of the
CBN, their level of profit declines.
ln otherwords, the need for robust
copitol to sotisf y regulotory
requirement shrinks the ossets

creotion copobility of Nigerion
bonks, hence foll in the overoll
profit.

Astonishingly, however inflotion
yield o negotive but insignificont
relotionships with profitobility. This
could probobly be due the obility
of bonks to frequently odjust their
lending rote even on the existing
focilities os inflotion rises, shifting
the burden to customers. Moreso,
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Table 7:

Error Correction Estimates of the ARDL Models

Equation

Equation 7

Dependent

Equation

Coefficient

t-Stotistics

Coefricient

0.06

o.69
2.40

0.09

c

o.324**
o.429*

Alca(-1)
Alca(-3)

Aly(-2)
Lif(-2)

-0.1l2**

-2.53

-4.851*

-J .48
I .92

2.503{<**

Llasi(-1)
Llasi(-2)

_0.813***<
_0.906+{<*

Alasi(-l)

2.390*

ALPR

t-Statistics
r.06

3.41

-3.379*

^if(-3)
alfl(-r)
ard(-3)

-3.97
-1.40

-0.05

Coef/icient

t-Statistics

-2.933+

-4.78

-4.933*

-3.s8

-1.O49*

-3.30

-0.583* *

-l .97
5

38

3.217*

2.20
-2.26

-3.739+

-80.407*
-0.301**
-0.852**
-o.762*

Aroa(-1)
Aroa(-2)
Aroa(-3)

Aldr(-l)

Aldr(-2)
Aldr(-3)
Alnie(-1)
Alnie(-2)
Alnie(-3)
Alqa(-2)
Alcata(-3)
artt(-2)
Apop(-2)
ecm(-l)

3.810*

_

-1.308*

0,533*

2.63

o.694***

1.95

10.289* * *

-1.67

.260*

-2.50

-1

_5.298**'i
-4.393*
-8,131*
-6.393*

-2.O3

6.105**

2.62

-1.451*

-2.98

o.43

o.7 t

1.990

2.O22

positive coefficients but
urther
buttressed the foct thot Nigerion
bonks rorely remunerote deposits
This

f

hence cost of funds does not
determine their level of returns.
The result of the error correction

model (ECM) os presented in
7 yield negotive results,
showing thot equilibrium con be

Toble

restored in cose of distortion. This
f urther corroborotes the existence
of long-run relotionships omong

the exomined voriobles (SungHoon ond Byoung-Ky, 2008) os
obtoined in the long-run
equotions.

Cumulotive sum (CUSUM) ond
cumulotive sum of squores
(CUSUMSa) of recursive residuols

tests were deployed

to test the

ond CUSUMSQ of oll the estimoted
models. The grophs demonstrote
the stobility of the equotions ond
porometers os oll the recursive
errors foll within the two criticol
lines of both techniques.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY

REMARKS

compiled for Nigerio
shows thot it is copoble of preempting finonciols crisis (Yoobo,
2012:Yoobo ond Adomu, 2015), it
is imperotives to further develop
methodologies thot will moke its
opplicotion relotively eosier os well
os explore its relotionships with
other mocro-voriobles so os to
Since the

FSls

17

-4.80
-5.52
-4.60

0.85

stobility of the estimoted
equotions ond porometers.
Figures I to 6 shows the CUSUM

5.0

-4.45
-4.45
1.50

1.655

ond deposit rote, olthough return

-s.94

-2.t5

3.97

0.60

the level of economic octivities
stotisticolly insignificont.

-s.o4

2.39

0.78
0.68

f

DW Stats

-2.57

-1 .80

Ale(-1)
Ale(-2)
Ale(-3)

R,
Adjusted

cs

uation 9

8

LLQA

ALCA

Variables

Run

201 6

boost its usefulness. With the
growlng consensus omong

economist thot the evolution of
economies over time tends to
cyclicolly move oround certoin
trend, hence the boom-bust

cycles. Understonding the
cyclicol pottern of those criticol
mocroeconomic voriobles ond

how they

relote

to

strength/weokness of the Nigerion
bonklng system is criticol for
effective ond efficient monetory
policy decision moking os well os

implementotion. This poper
empiricolly exomined the
relotionship between FSls ond
mocro-fundomenlols in Nlgerio.
However, considering the foct FSls
ore still evolving ond still being
refined, it is difficult to moke o
strong conclusion bosed on the
outcome of the study but given
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Residual Test for Capital Adequacy Equation
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Figure 5: Cumulative Sum of Recursive
Residual Test for Profitability Equation

the theoreticolly coherent
relotionships estoblished omong
FSls, level of economic octivity,

inflotion, interest rote ond
exchonge rote, it follows thot the
soundness of the Nigerion bonking
system con be mirrored through

hoppenings

in the

mocroeconomy. Thus, the results
provide on insight into the
usefulness of the doto os well os

when the movement of
mocroeconomics voriobles

should be of utmost concern to

Figure 6: Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursrve
Residual Test for profitability Equation

the policy mokers. The results
reveol not only when

developments in the mocro
economy should signols the
strength/vulnerobilities in the
bonking system but olso show lhe

mognitude

of

the

strenglh/weokness thot should be
onticipoted in the sector. Hence,
serves os worning signol to policy
mokers to toke prooctive policy
meosures to overt impending
crisis. lmmediote deployment of
the FSls is, therefore, suggested os

r8

odditionol monitoring instrument,
to be used side-by-side with the
existing micro-prudentiol tools.
Furthermore, in order to enhonce
the efficiency of the FSls os o tool
for mocroprudentiol regulotion,
more effort should be geored

towords improving the

compilotion process ond the

resultont FSls thoroughly tested
using vorying methodologies to
oscertoin their correctness.
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